The U.S. has shifted its Latin American counter-cartel campaign from maritime interdiction toward direct land-based military operations, with Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, and potentially Guatemala emerging as operating environments. Named the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition (A3C) or Shield of the Americas, this is likely to increase physical security risks through retaliatory violence, criminal displacement, targeting errors, and disruption to commercial operations in affected regions.
OVERVIEW
On August 12, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced Colombia, Honduras, and Guatemala were prepared to participate in combined U.S. military operations against organizations Washington characterized as “narco-terrorists.” The announcement was made at the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition (A3C) forum, where Colombia formally became the coalition’s 19th member. Hegseth described Ecuador as the first coalition member to conduct a combined kinetic operation with the United States and presented the expansion as a model for the wider region.
The operational shift represents an expansion of the U.S. campaign from maritime interdiction toward land-based targeting. Hegseth said Operation Southern Spear produced major reductions in suspected narcotics-vessel movements, claiming reductions of approximately 65 percent in the Western Caribbean, 60 percent in the Eastern Caribbean, and nearly 50 percent in the Eastern Pacific, and argued the same approach should be applied on land.
Hegseth has posited the United States retains the right to defend itself and its partners without submitting military decisions to international institutions, urging A3C members to leave the International Criminal Court (ICC), and described Southern Spear as a model for targeting and killing narco-terrorists. Operations in late 2025 progressively expanded in scale and lethality, particularly around Venezuela, showing how counter-cartel operations can evolve into sustained military involvement, heightened political pressure, and ultimately broader U.S. engagement with the target state.
ANALYSIS
The physical security implications of the policy shift are likely to extend beyond areas directly targeted by U.S. or partner nations. The expansion of military activity increases the potential for kinetic incidents, retaliatory violence, criminal displacement, and disruption to personnel, infrastructure, and supply chains in affected regions. These risks are compounded by uncertainty over targeting accuracy, the legal basis for operations, and the durability of host-government consent.
These primary risks are likely to intensify as expanded operations blur the distinction between legitimate and suspected targets, increasing the potential for collateral harm, retaliatory violence, and criminal displacement as armed groups adapt to increased pressure. A secondary risk exists where these dynamics could create an escalation pathway resembling the aforementioned Venezuela trajectory, although the likelihood and form of such an outcome will vary by country given differences in political alignment, security cooperation, domestic constraints, and strategic interests.
While there is currently insufficient evidence Washington intends to replicate this model elsewhere, this potential escalation pathway increases the importance of monitoring countries where security cooperation is deepening.
- Crossfire and misidentification risk:
- On March 3, Soldiers arrived by helicopter at San Martín village, Sucumbíos, and destroyed farm buildings. The Ecuador cattle-farm incident demonstrated targeting under this doctrine is not precise. Individuals and operations with agricultural, extractive, or logistics assets in rural zones of Colombia, Honduras, Guatemala, and Ecuador, particularly areas historically associated with trafficking routes or armed-group presence, face a risk of misidentification.
- Retaliatory and displacement violence:
- Targeting groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) is likely to provoke retaliation, including against businesses or personnel perceived as state-aligned or U.S.-linked security contractors, energy and agricultural firms, and NGOs cooperating with government forces.
- Legal and reputational exposure:
- Hegseth acknowledged the ICC may investigate the boat-strike campaign, and the explicit bypassing of the judicial process raises human-rights and international-law concerns. Companies partnered with host-government security forces should assess exposure tied to operations outside recognized due-process standards.
- Political volatility and consent instability:
- Guatemala’s denial of any agreement and Ecuador’s precedent of proceeding despite a referendum against foreign military presence, show host-nation consent is neither uniform nor stable. Government changes or domestic legal challenges could rapidly redraw which areas are active operational zones.
“Venezuela trajectory” risk: could a host country become the next Venezuela? The 2026 Venezuela trajectory demonstrated how initially limited U.S. military cooperation focused on counter-narcotics and “narco-terrorist” threats can develop into progressively deeper U.S. involvement, including direct military intervention and an expanded role in strategic economic sectors.
- Colombia carries the highest structural resemblance risk. A U.S.-aligned president has proactively invited Department of Defense (DoD) involvement, accepted a large U.S. security package, and joined a formal U.S.-led coalition. The same posture of deepening bilateral security dependency seen in Venezuela before the January operation. Colombia’s oil, mining, and coca-growing regions represent a comparable resource base which could become entangled in any future escalation.
- Ecuador is the most advanced case, operationally hosting joint raids despite a domestic referendum rejecting foreign bases, indicating popular political consent is not a reliable constraint once operations begin. This normalizes an escalation path other countries may also follow with limited domestic recourse.
- Honduras and Guatemala present a different risk profile: contested or denied consent particularly from Guatemala, makes near-term deep cooperation less likely but raises the risk of unilateral U.S. action proceeding regardless of host-government agreement. A scenario with fewer guardrails than Colombia’s invited cooperation, and one which more closely mirrors the unilateral character of the Venezuela operation.
OUTLOOK
Concentric assesses U.S. military involvement in Latin American counter-cartel operations is likely to expand in the near term, although the scale and geographic scope will remain dependent on host-government consent and the ability to translate existing agreements into operational missions. Colombia is likely to become the most significant new operating environment given President Abelardo de la Espriella’s support for U.S. military involvement. Ecuador is likely to remain the principal operational precedent, while Honduras and Guatemala are likely to develop more cautiously as Washington clarifies the legal basis for joint operations. The first confirmed U.S.-Colombian kinetic operation would be a key indicator of a broader land-based campaign.
The expansion is likely to increase physical security risks for businesses and personnel, particularly where commercial operations overlap with trafficking corridors or armed-group territory. Increased targeting of groups such as the ELN is likely to generate retaliation, criminal displacement, and attempts to replace lost revenues through extortion, kidnapping, cargo theft, and attacks on infrastructure. The Ecuador cattle-farm incident demonstrated the potential for targeting failures to expose legitimate operations to collateral damage.
HOW CONCENTRIC CAN HELP
Concentric offers a suite of services designed to mitigate risks and enable secure business operations in unpredictable environments:
- Travel Risk Assessments and Alerting: Concentric offers customized reports offering real-time, itinerary-focused evaluations of changing geopolitical, security, and environmental conditions. We also offer tailored, real-time intelligence based on travelers’ live locations and planned movements.
- Security Operations: Concentric provides on-the-ground advisory support, executive protection, and operational security planning across Latin America.
- Evacuation and Crisis Management Planning: Concentric’s intelligence and security teams deliver crisis-management support, including evacuation route planning, maritime risk assessments, safe-haven identification, and localized emergency response.
Through Concentric’s advanced geopolitical intelligence strategies, businesses can effectively navigate travel risks, safeguard their personnel, and ensure operational continuity across global environments. For more information or to arrange a consultation to enhance your organization’s travel security capabilities, please contact our Global Intelligence team today.
