KEY INSIGHTS
Ethiopia plans to hold a general election on June 1, in a degraded pre-election security environment and we assess the election will proceed in a fractured environment, with elevated risks of an open Tigray war and a wider Ethiopia–Sudan proxy escalation in the weeks surrounding polling. On May 5, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) reinstated the pre-war regional government and elected hardline chairman Debretsion Gebremichael as president, voiding the 2022 Pretoria Agreement and producing a rival administration in Mekelle. The same day, Sudan accused Ethiopia of hosting Rapid Support Forces (RSF) drones which targeted Khartoum airport, recalled its ambassador, and threatened open confrontation. Federal and Tigrayan forces held a heavy military standoff along the Tigray border since February, with Eritrean units reportedly operating alongside Tigrayan formations. The vote is set to exclude Tigray entirely, and the main Oromo opposition is contesting only select Addis Ababa constituencies.
KEY EVENTS
May 9, 2026: TPLF chairman Debretsion Gebremichael occupied the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) cabinet hall in Mekelle under armed protection.
May 5, 2026: The TPLF formally reinstated the pre-war Tigray government, voiding the Pretoria Agreement.
May 5, 2026: Sudan accused Ethiopia of hosting RSF drones targeting Khartoum airport, recalled its ambassador, and warned of open confrontation.
April 8, 2026: The federal government extended the TIA mandate by one year – the final extension under current law.
February 10, 2026: Reuters published satellite imagery of a drone hangar at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz supporting RSF operations in Sudan’s Blue Nile state.
ANALYSIS
Ethiopia will hold its seventh general election while the federal government simultaneously manages the collapse of one regional settlement, an insurgency in another, a Gulf-driven fuel shock, and a low-intensity proxy war with a neighbor. The operating environment is the most strained of any Ethiopian poll since 2005. Opposition parties reject the National Election Board’s “traffic light” security map as reliant on state data, and the Oromo Federalist Congress is contesting only parts of Addis Ababa. Election monitors reported political party representatives attended only 14 percent of monitored voter registration sites demonstrating the restricted nature of the upcoming election. Domestic pressure has also led to political violence, as assailants killed one election official and abducted seven others during registrations.
Despite deep domestic pressures the most significant risk stems from the structural collapse of the Pretoria Agreement. Tensions in Tigray have continued to gain attention and reflect fourteen months of compounding political moves which have produced a dynamic resembling the run-up to the 2020 war.
In Tigray, Eritrea remains a destabilizing external variable aligning opportunistically with the TPLF over unresolved Pretoria grievances and catalyzed by Ethiopia’s ambitions for control of the port of Assab. The Tigrayan domestic picture is equally tangled, with the Debretsion-led TPLF now claiming political authority, the TDF aligned to its command, and Tadesse Worede’s TIA struggling to hold out alone as a federal-aligned remnant.
The Sudan border complicates stability as tensions have recently shifted from low-intensity friction to a rapidly escalating bilateral dispute. Ethiopia began directly backing the RSF in 2025 as a hedge against Egypt and retaliation against ties between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the TPLF. Satellite imagery confirmed dedicated RSF drone infrastructure inside Ethiopia at Asosa and the RSF has used Ethiopian rear bases for its Blue Nile offensive. The May 4, RSF drone strike on Khartoum International Airport escalated tensions. In response, Sudan recalled its ambassador, deployed forces to the Ethiopian frontier in Gedaref state, and launched offensives against RSF border positions in Blue Nile.
OUTLOOK
We assess three possible scenarios: escalation, status quo, and de-escalation, through the election window and its immediate aftermath.
Escalation: Tigray War Ignition. Although improbable, this remains the highest-impact scenario: within days to weeks of polling, federal forces may launch renewed operations against the Debretsion-led Tigray administration. The TDF, with probable Eritrean involvement, would resist. In this scenario severe corporate impacts are widespread, airspace constraints, fuel rationing, staff evacuations, sharp insurance and security cost increases, and international sanctions may all be present.
Status Quo: Contested Vote and Contained Conflict. The probable trajectory is the vote proceeds on schedule with reduced turnout, no participation in Tigray, and contested results in Amhara and Oromia. The federal–TPLF standoff in Mekelle persists without a major offensive. Corporate exposure is significant but manageable through enhanced vigilance and contingency planning.
De-escalation: Managed Vote and Strategic Pause. Although this is the most stabilizing scenario, we assess it is highly-improbable because of the lack of current diplomatic efforts. Under this scenario we would expect a last-minute mediated agreement, likely via the African Union or a Gulf state, and a national election without armed escalation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
We advise businesses, NGOs, foreign travelers, and organizations with personnel, contractors, or supply chains in Ethiopia to consider the following risk-mitigation measures:
- Reassess Travel and Movement: Suspend non-essential travel to Tigray and restrict movement in Amhara, western Oromia, and Benishangul-Gumuz.
- Strengthen Local Monitoring and Communications: Maintain regular contact with local staff, drivers, site managers, and security providers through the June 1–30 election window.
- Review Continuity, Evacuation, and Compliance Planning: Prepare for potential Addis Ababa Bole airport disruptions amidst Iran-war fuel rationing, road blockades, and reduced warning time on Tigray-border incidents.
