KEY INSIGHTS
Cuba is likely to remain under authoritarian control through 2026, despite severe economic and social strains. Energy shortages, economic contraction, and sustained emigration have weakened resilience and eroded legitimacy but have not yet fractured elite cohesion or state authority. The decisive variable is external. U.S. policy choices, following Cuba’s designation as an unusual and extraordinary threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy, will have a greater impact on regime stability than domestic unrest. Leadership disruption is plausible under coercive or negotiated conditions, but a rapid democratic transition remains unlikely. The most probable outcome is regime adaptation within existing power structures, not systemic political change.
ANALYSIS
Cuba confronts overlapping energy shortages, economic contraction, demographic decline, and tightening external constraints. The loss of Venezuelan oil following the U.S. capture of Nicolás Maduro and subsequent pressure on alternative energy and logistics channels has produced rolling blackouts, transport disruption, aviation constraints, and declining state revenue.
Using core pillars of stability, we judge resilience and legitimacy are under strain, while authority remains intact. Resilience is significantly weakened. Legitimacy has eroded—protests linked to power outages, inflation, and scarcity continued through 2025 and into 2026. Authority, the state’s capacity to exercise control and maintain a monopoly on force, remains intact. The government retains territorial control and suppresses dissent. We observed no public signs of elite fragmentation within the Communist Party, armed forces, or internal security services.
Regime cohesion remains institutional rather than personal. Power is dispersed among party leadership, the armed forces, and security organs rather than concentrated in a single figure. Cuba also lacks an organized national opposition capable of converting domestic instability into reform.
A U.S. operation similar to the one conducted in Venezuela cannot be ruled out under the current administration. However, Cuba presents a different strategic calculus. While symbolically significant, it offers fewer direct economic incentives for intervention, and any action would be weighed against the risk of triggering mass emigration flows. Cuba’s security architecture reflects decades of preparation against U.S. intervention.
FORWARD-LOOKING SCENARIOS, 2026 TO 2028
Scenario 1: Continued Authoritarian Control Under Economic Strain — The regime absorbs further economic decline, applies selective repression, manages limited humanitarian relief, and relies on emigration as a social pressure valve. Leadership remains stable or changes only symbolically. Living standards deteriorate, but institutional control persists.
Scenario 2: Managed Leadership Change — Rising economic and subsequent civil pressure leads to Díaz-Canel’s internal replacement by a figure acceptable to core regime actors. Leadership changes, but the system endures.
Scenario 3: Externally Driven Leadership Removal — U.S. direct action removes or incapacitates senior leadership without full occupation. Short-term instability would likely follow, and democratic consolidation would remain uncertain.
Authored by: Oliver Maund
